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ORAL ARGUMENT REFORM IN UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS: 
SEEKING TO REVITALIZE ORAL ARGUMENT  




[I]t will be a sorry day for the American bar if the place of the oral 
argument in our appellate courts is depreciated and oral advocacy 
becomes looked upon as a pro forma exercise which, because of tradition 
or because of the insistence of his client, a lawyer has to go through.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The modern institution of appellate oral argument has unfortunately arrived at 
this “sorry day.” It has simultaneously been both devalued and tediously used as a 
formalized relic of the past. This dual depreciation stems from two polarized 
perspectives. One viewpoint is that oral argument is an antiquated and ineffective 
tradition that should be completely replaced with written appellate argument.2 
Supporters of this viewpoint cite the decreasing rate of oral argument in appellate 
courts3 and the general judicial perception of its irrelevance as evidence of the 
institution’s imminent disappearance.4 The opposing camp argues the reverse; it 
attempts to preserve the tradition by returning to a format where appellate 
argument is predominately oral—consistent with Great Britain and other common 
law countries.5 This group claims that the value of oral argument rests in a judicial 
process that is visible and open to public scrutiny.6 They further argue that this 
                                                     
* © 2013 Clark Collings. Special thanks to my wife, Jennifer, and her tireless 
support. Many thanks to Daniel Medwed and Jared Tingey for their assistance in testing 
my thesis. I would also like to thank the staff and executive editors of the Utah Law Review 
for their contributions to this Note. 
1 John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an 
Appeal?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 6, 11 (1955) (emphasis added). 
2 See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the 
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 n.14 (1986). 
3 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl.S-1 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf 
(reporting that nearly 75% of the cases decided in 2010 in the United States Courts of 
Appeals were decided without oral argument). 
4 See Warren D. Wolfson, Oral Argument: Does It Matter?, 35 IND. L. REV. 451, 454 
(2002) (estimating that only 5 to 10% of the remaining cases that are orally argued change 
a judge’s mind). 
5 See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA 
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2004). 
6 Martineau, supra note 2, at 11. 
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policy goal cannot be achieved if judges are deciding cases by simply reading 
briefs behind closed doors. 
Although both camps make compelling arguments, the solution to the debate 
does not lie within a counter-reform—a complete resurrection of oral argument in 
every appeal7—nor does it call for a complete extinction of the practice. Rather, 
the solution can be found somewhere in the middle. Instead of focusing solely on 
the preeminence of either oral or written argument, the courts should try to 
effectively marry the two approaches to achieve optimal appellate review and 
client advocacy. Appellate oral argument’s current procedural format is stuffy and 
ineffective. What it is designed to accomplish is necessary, but the vehicle it uses 
to achieve its purpose is outdated. As a result, it is becoming extinct in today’s 
fast-paced appellate world. Therefore, the primary purpose of this Note is to 
explore and prescribe several procedural reforms that are designed to revitalize the 
institution and restore its purpose in the national appellate court system. 
This Note proposes that the Utah appellate court system implement the 
prescribed solutions as a preliminary test and set an example for the rest of the 
nation. Part II of this Note will address the general purpose of oral argument, 
outlining its benefits and the overall importance of the practice. Part III will 
emphasize the negative impact of current appellate procedures on the judicial 
process and the difficulties courts face when approaching oral argument. Part IV 
will delineate the Utah state appellate court structure and how the current appellate 
rules addressing oral argument are applied. Additionally, it will discuss the 
progression of the current procedural rules governing oral argument in Utah and 
will address the reasons why the Utah judicial system is an ideal laboratory to test 
these modifications. Part V will explore and propose solutions to the problems 
discussed in Parts III and IV. These solutions include a proposal to implement a 
tentative-opinion program, a proposal to redesign the current format of oral 
argument, and strategies to overcome confirmation bias among the judges. Lastly, 
Part VI will briefly summarize the arguments and solutions discussed throughout 
the Note. 
 
II.  THE PURPOSE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
 
Appellate oral argument is valuable and irreplaceable. Its primary purpose is 
to achieve optimal client advocacy and judicial review.8 All other benefits are by-
products of the process. The ultimate goal of bringing counsel before a panel of 
judges is to give a litigant his day in court and to help that court arrive at a just 
decision for that litigant. Judge Albert Tate Jr. believed that oral argument’s 
“purpose is to assist and enlighten the court and if possible to incline the court to 
                                                     
7 Id. at 4 n.13 (“One federal judge has gone so far as to advocate making all appeals 
discretionary in the courts of appeals so that oral argument can be held in every case.”). 
8 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 627, 629 
(1962) (“The job of an appellate argument is to win a particular case before a particular 
tribunal, for a particular client.”). 
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give sympathetic consideration to the client’s view.”9 Additionally, Justice Simeon 
R. Acoba Jr. described oral argument as a “dialogue among the members of the 
court and counsel, which . . . enlivens the written briefs, heightens [the court’s] 
awareness of what is significant to the parties, and invigorates [its] analytical 
senses.”10 Oral argument goes hand in hand with written briefing. When oral 
argument takes place without written briefs, the court is left unprepared to discuss 
the issues. Likewise, written briefing without oral argument leaves the court with 
unanswered questions. Although there is no constitutional right to oral argument,11 
its notion straddles the line of due process and equity.12 In addition to its primary 
purpose, oral argument produces a bounty of benefits that are vital to the judicial 
process. These beneficial by-products are useful in defending the continued need 
of oral argument in appellate review.13 
Oral argument keeps the court’s doors open to the public, and thereby judges 
are accountable to the public—not only for the decisions they make, but also for 
the reasoning they employ to arrive at a decision.14 In 1999, Justice Stanley Mosk 
of the California Supreme Court published an article defending the importance of 
oral argument.15 In his article he discusses the public good that is served as a result 
of hearing oral argument.16 He states: 
 
[Oral] argument and its subsequent reporting in the media enable 
members of the public to hear and understand the contentions of the 
conflicting litigants. Ordinary observers cannot be expected to seek out 
the respective briefs, unless, of course, they have a peculiar or potential 
financial interest in the result of the litigation. Nor must they be  
expected in every instance to merely wait months for the ultimate  
published opinion.17 
 
                                                     
9 Albert Tate Jr., The Appellate Advocate and the Appellate Court, 13 LA. B.J. 107, 
112 (1965). 
10 Blair v. Harris, 45 P.3d 798, 808 (Haw. 2002) (Acoba, J., dissenting). 
11 Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 706 (“[O]ral 
argument is a tool for assisting the appellate court in its decision making process, not an 
independent due process right vested in the parties.”). 
12 See Blair, 45 P.3d at 809 (“I believe the parties should be entitled to employ oral 
advocacy in their efforts to persuade us . . . .”); Stanley Mosk, In Defense of Oral 
Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25, 26 (1999) (“Primarily [oral argument] enables 
the client—a member of the public—to have his point of view presented out in the open to 
the reviewing court. He believes it is his right, and for that purpose he engages an attorney 
to make his voice heard.”). 
13 See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 454 (“There are other substantial benefits to oral 
argument, aside from changing minds or making up minds. These other benefits more than 
make the case for oral arguments.”). 
14 See Mosk, supra note 12, at 27. 
15 See id. at 25. 
16 Id. at 26. 
17 Id. 
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Additionally, oral argument contributes to sound public policy because it 
reminds the judges of the other players in the appeal and prevents them from 
becoming “too isolated.”18 Oral argument also provides a type of scholarly think 
tank for counsel and the judges to predict unforeseen negative consequences of a 
particular decision by addressing hypotheticals.19 Although the benefits cited 
above are not the principal purpose of oral argument, they show that in addition to 
client advocacy and appellate review, oral argument offers a diversity of benefits 
that would be lost if it were completely abandoned. Justice William J. Brennan 
summarized oral argument’s value when he concluded that “oral argument is the 
absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate advocacy. . . . [O]ften my whole 
notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument. This happens even 
though I read the briefs before oral argument . . . .”20 As a result, courts must 
continue to strive to fulfill these purposes and retain these benefits by preserving 
an effective form of oral argument through procedural modification. Failure to do 
so has resulted in the weakened foundation of the institution, and opened the door 
for critics to call for its demise. 
 
III.  WHEN PROCEDURE DILUTES PURPOSE 
 
As the debate over the usefulness of oral argument continues, those who 
demand its abolishment cite several drawbacks as evidence of its uselessness. 
These criticisms, however, are only based in procedural weakness and do not strike 
at the core purpose of oral argument.21 Therefore, the weaknesses these critics 
describe do not bolster their position that oral argument should be abolished; 
rather, they show that oral argument only requires procedural modifications to 
correct the problem. The following section discusses the most common 
weaknesses and shortcomings attributed to oral argument. 
The two most popular criticisms of oral argument are (1) that it takes too long 
and (2) that the courts are too busy to expend judicial resources on such an activity. 
The critics state, “[O]ral argument, even when reduced to only ten or fifteen 
minutes per party, requires that judges and their staff travel to the court and sit 
through the [proceedings].”22 These critics further complain, “Oral argument also 
requires the full attention of the judges and their staff to the cases being argued. 
The criticism is that the judges and staff are then left without opportunity to attend 
                                                     
18 Martineau, supra note 2, at 13. 
19 See Mosk, supra note 12, at 27 (“[S]killful interrogation of counsel from the bench 
may reveal how a proposed legislative or judicial rule will actually perform in day-to-day 
practice. This may often be accomplished by suggesting hypothetical circumstances or by 
asking counsel to offer such possibilities.”). 
20 HARVARD LAW SCH., OCCASIONAL PAMPHLET NO. 9, PROCEEDINGS IN HONOR OF 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 22 (1967). 
21 See discussion supra Part II. 
22 Erick Rivero, Asylum and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the 
Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 1517 (2006). 
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to any other matters during the course of an oral argument day.”23 In connection 
with the complaint regarding lack of time, critics mention large caseloads as 
evidence of oral argument’s futility.24 
Utah appellate courts have dealt with the lack-of-time issue by rigidly limiting 
time for oral argument. But the time limit creates problems of its own for 
attorneys. Utah’s Practitioner’s Guide to Oral Argument describes the need for 
haste in oral arguments by advising attorneys to be concise so as to not waste the 
limited time they are granted for oral argument.25 It almost seems as if the court is 
rushing through the process in order to move on to other tasks. It is understandable 
that the panel is busy and has many cases to review, but it is less understandable 
that judges choose to be so formalistic as to shut their ears to a valid argument just 
because the time ended. Additionally, if oral argument is truly important, why is 
the panel so concerned with keeping to a rigid time allotment? Although engaging 
in oral argument does require more time, like any meaningful endeavor, the 
investor can expect a valuable return on his investment. Rosco Pound reflected this 
same belief when he explained that “the rules limiting the time of argument 
. . . suggest [an] attitude toward oral argument as something in which the bar are to 
be indulged rather than as an effective aid to correct decision.”26 
Oral argument is also criticized because the parties involved, the attorneys 
and the judges, are imperfect beings that make mistakes.27 For example, parties 
often lose precious time during oral arguments because some judges have a 
propensity to bully counsel or lead their argument astray with tangential lines of 
questioning.28 In some cases, judges focus on an unrelated issue or attempt to get 
                                                     
23 Id. 
24 See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and 
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 
659, 661 (2007). 
25 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ORAL  
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 4 (2011), available  
at http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/sup/forms/Practitioners_Guide_To_Oral_Argument.pdf 
(“[T]he allotted time for argument is consumed quickly, especially when numerous 
questions come from the Court. Counsel should be prepared to concisely present the 
strongest or most significant elements of the case. . . . The Court encourages counsel to 
submit the matter with time remaining if appropriate.”). 
26 ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 370 (1941). 
27 Roger Handberg, Judicial Accountability and Independence: Balancing 
Incompatibles?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 127 (1994) (“[J]udges are not perfect, but only 
human . . . .”); Jon Newberry, Nobody’s Perfeck: For Lawyers Who Think They Must 
Always Be Invincible, Acknowledging an Error and Taking Corrective Action Go Hand in 
Hand, A.B.A. J. Mar. 1996, at 70, 70 (1996) (“The best lawyers are not perfect, but they do 
handle their mistakes well.”). 
28 See Mosk, supra note 12, at 26 (providing an example of a California judge who 
always interrupted lawyers at the beginning of their oral argument with certain questions 
that inevitably distracted the lawyers from the substance of their arguments). 
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the attorney to commit to unfavorable assertions about the case.29 Justice Mosk 
recalls a justice on the California Supreme Court “who would interrupt counsel’s 
oral presentation at the outset with this critique: ‘Is your argument in your brief? If 
so, there is no need to repeat it here. If it is not, why not?’”30 Justice Mosk 
continued: “The beleaguered counsel was then required to explain his technique 
rather than to devote his limited time to the substance of his contention.”31 This 
behavior is counterproductive. It wastes the lawyer’s, and most importantly, the 
client’s valuable time. Furthermore, lawyers often spend months preparing for oral 
argument only to be interrupted in the middle of their introduction by an 
unexpected line of questions from a judge.32 
In connection with the judge’s shortcomings, another prevalent criticism and 
drawback to today’s oral argument procedure is the panel’s own confirmation 
bias.33 According to Professor Alafair Burke, “[C]onfirmation bias is the tendency 
of people, when they are testing the validity of a theory, to favor information that 
confirms the theory over disconfirming information.”34 For example, an appellate 
judge may formulate a theory of the case and an inevitable decision as a result of 
reading the briefs in preparation for oral argument. At oral argument, under the 
confirmation bias theory, that particular judge may be prone to only ask questions 
or look for arguments that support, rather than disconfirm, her view of the case.35 
Essentially, judges are not allowing oral argument to add anything to the 
discussion because they have already made up their minds. A variety of judges 
have confirmed this theory. Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, appellate judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit believes: 
                                                     
29 Mark Hummels, Distributing Draft Decisions Before Oral Argument on Appeal: 
Should the Court Tip Its Tentative Hand? The Case for Dissemination, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 
317, 317–19 (2004); see also Stephen M. Shapiro, Questions, Answers, and Prepared 
Remarks, LITIG., Spring 1989, at 33, 36 (warning that appellate judges may engage in 
extended debates with counsel over issues that are not central to the case and that advocates 
must seek to avoid “becoming bogged down in intellectually stimulating digressions while 
precious argument time ticks away”). 
30 Mosk, supra note 12, at 26. 
31 Id. 
32 See Wolfson, supra note 4, at 455. 
33 Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 516 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias]. Other 
culprits responsible for a judge’s inability to change his mind in oral argument could 
include selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance; however, a discussion of these cognitive psychology studies is 
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial 
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 
passim (2006) (discussing alternative possibilities to cognitive biases). 
34 Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 33, at 516 n.17 (citing PETER C. 
WASON & PHILIP N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, PSYCHOLOGY OF REASONING: STRUCTURE & 
CONTENT (1972)). 
35 Cf. id. at 516–17 (applying the cognitive strategies to prosecutors rather  
than judges). 
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[W]hen I change . . . my mind at oral argument, more often than not it is 
because the performance at argument did not meet the promise of the 
brief. My mind was changed because the argument did not properly 
defend the brief. The case was not won at oral argument; it was lost.36 
 
Additionally, a ten-month observation of Judge Richard S. Arnold of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that oral arguments failed to 
change his mind in 131 out 157 cases.37 Moreover, attorneys are beginning to see 
the futility in arguing a case that is already decided in the minds of the judges. One 
attorney’s sentiment reflected a general sense of discouragement when he said that 
“most lawyers can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times oral 
argument actually seemed to make a difference.”38 If judges do not find oral 
argument useful and have firmly decided the case before hearing argument, why 
continue the course? The solution, however, does not lay in abolishing oral 
argument, but instead it must be found in removing the judge’s biases. 
As mentioned above, attorneys are not without their fair share of the blame. 
They have been accused of wasting argument time with poorly prepared 
presentations. In some cases, attorneys seem uninterested, read verbatim from their 
briefs, and repeat themselves constantly.39 Furthermore, counsel has been accused 
of mis-citing cases, arguing “weak, silly, or frivolous issues—which shouldn’t be 
in the briefs in the first place,”40 and sidestepping questions put forth by the 
bench.41 It is difficult for a court to reach an equitable decision in the appellate-
review process when counsel is not fulfilling its end of the deal. 
Given all of its human shortcomings, there is still value in oral argument. New 
oral argument procedures are designed to free up the court’s docket and allow 
frivolous appeals to be disposed of quickly and efficiently. The courts, having 
devoted time and resources to make their dockets lighter and the process more 
streamlined, have unfortunately all but abandoned the usefulness of appropriate 
oral argument. Only meaningful procedural reform can return this lost value to the 
court and allow oral argument to flourish again. 
 
                                                     
36 RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL 
ARGUMENT 294 (1996). 
37 Myron H. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial!, A.B.A. 
J., Sept. 1984, at 68, 68–70. 
38 Robert E. Shapiro, Advance Sheet, LITIG., Summer 2001, at 59. 
39 Wolfson, supra note 4, at 454. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 455. 
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IV.  UTAH: WHERE PROCEDURE CAN EMBRACE PURPOSE 
 
A.  The Utah Experiment 
 
Utah offers the fertile legal landscape necessary to reform the broken oral 
argument system. First, the Utah appellate court system carries a relatively smaller 
caseload than most states with a similar population size.42 In 2008, the total 
number of appeals filed in both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals hovered close to 1,450.43 Kansas, West Virginia, and Nevada—states with 
roughly the same or smaller population size—had almost twice as many appeals 
filed in their respective states in 2008.44 As a result, the Utah state appellate system 
is not overwhelmed by heavy caseloads like those states that use their workload as 
justification for cutting back on oral argument. Second, Utah is fundamentally 
open to allowing oral argument in its appeals. Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor 
the Utah Court of Appeals requires litigants to formally request oral argument. 
Thus both courts are structurally open to hearing oral argument on every appeal. 
Furthermore, as of 2004, the Utah Supreme Court was one of only three state 
supreme courts to automatically schedule oral argument in all cases.45 
Accordingly, Utah is well positioned to experiment with a procedural reform that 
will assist its efforts to improve oral argument in its appellate courts. 
 
B.  Utah State Appellate Court Structure and the Application of Rule 29 
 
To better understand both the potential effects of and the need for 
implementing procedural modifications in the Utah appellate system, it is useful to 
understand how the system is structured. Additionally, it is important to know how 
Utah’s appellate procedure rules relating to oral argument are applied in its 
appellate courts. 
Currently Utah has two appellate courts, the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court is the state’s only “court of last 
resort,” and it is responsible for all appeals relating to civil cases, capital and first-
degree felony cases, and all proceedings relating to the Judicial Conduct 
Commission, attorney discipline, and constitutional questions.46 The Utah Supreme 
Court, consisting of five justices who serve ten-year terms, also has jurisdiction 
                                                     
42 See R. LAFOUNTAIN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 2 (2010). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. (showing that Kansas had 2,742 incoming cases in its appellate courts, West 
Virginia had 2,411, and Nevada had 2,248). 
45 See DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 151–54 tbl.26 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp 
.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf. 
46 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS (2007), available 
at http://www.utcourts.gov/knowcts/docs/Appellate_Court_Brochure.pdf. 
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over the Utah Court of Appeals.47 The Utah Court of Appeals was created in 1987 
and consists of seven judges who serve six-year terms.48 It is responsible for all 
district court criminal appeals (excluding capital and first-degree felony cases), 
domestic relationship appeals, and all juvenile court appeals.49 It also hears any 
other cases transferred to it from the Utah Supreme Court.50 
Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governs oral argument for 
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals.51 Subsection (a) of 
Rule 29 allows oral argument in all cases without a formal request, but it also gives 
the courts the ability to deny oral argument in frivolous appeals, appeals where a 
dispositive issue has been “recently authoritatively decided,” and in appeals where 
“the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record 
and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”52 
Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals has used this discretion and denied oral 
argument in several cases.53 Subsection (c) outlines the “order of oral argument.”54 
This subsection reflects the rigid procedure present in most appellate courts 
today.55 Lastly, subsection (f) gives litigants the option to waive argument and 
receive a decision on the submitted briefs. 
Rule 29 has recently been amended to address the courts’ presumption of oral 
argument.56 The Advisory Committee Notes explain, “[T]he former practice was to 
presume that argument was waived unless requested. The amendments change the 
practice to presume that argument is requested unless expressly waived. The rule 
incorporates the oral argument priority classification formerly found in the 
administrative orders of the Supreme Court.”57 This is one reason why Utah is a 
particularly ideal location for procedural reform. Unlike other jurisdictions that are 
introducing rules that limit oral argument, Utah is expanding the right to oral 
argument, thus reflecting the State’s willingness for further reform. 
Even though Utah has amended Rule 29 to allow more oral arguments, its 
procedural structure, like most appellate courts, is antiquated and seems to engage 
in the process for traditional reasons. The appellate process in the Utah Supreme 
Court and Utah Court of Appeals starts with the appellant filing a notice of appeal 





51 UTAH R. APP. P. 29. 
52 Id. 29(a)(1)–(3). 
53 See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Hughes, 2011 UT App 128, ¶ 1 n.2, 253 P.3d 1118. 
54 UTAH R. APP. P. 29(c). 
55 Id. (“The appellant shall argue first and the appellee shall respond. The appellant 
may reply to the appellee’s argument if appellant reserved part of appellant’s time for this 
purpose. Such argument in reply shall be limited to answering points made by appellee in 
appellee’s oral argument.”). 
56 UTAH R. APP. P. 29 advisory committee note. 
57 Id. 
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with the court no later than thirty days after the trial court’s judgment.58 From 
there, the parties file briefs and the trial court record is sent to the appellate court.59 
Once the appellate court has these documents in its possession, oral argument is 
heard, and thereafter the court issues an opinion to the lower court and to the 
parties involved.60 The mechanics of the oral argument format in the Utah 
appellate courts are very similar to other courts across the country. It is formalistic 
and fairly brief. The Utah Supreme Court hears cases on the first Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday of every month, excluding January, July, and August.61 
It allows each party twenty minutes to address the court, totaling forty minutes per 
session.62 The Utah Court of Appeals hears arguments in the Matheson 
Courthouse, usually in the last two weeks of every month, excluding July and 
December.63 This court usually hears two to three arguments a day.64 It also 
encourages counsel to be well prepared for “the presentation and judicial dialogue 
that constitute oral argument.”65 The court allows each party fifteen minutes to 
address the court, totaling thirty minutes per session.66 In both the Utah Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeals these time requirements are strictly followed and kept 
by a timer on counsel’s podium.67 Similarly, the remaining procedures are 
followed in both courts. As is the tradition with all appellate courts, the appellant 
argues first and is allowed to allocate a portion of his time for rebuttal.68 Thereafter 
the appellee argues, and then the appellant engages in his rebuttal.69 If time 
concludes as counsel is explaining a legal theory or argument, he must stop 
immediately.70 The Utah State Judiciary has even stated, “[T]he allotted time for 
argument is consumed quickly, especially when numerous questions come from 
the Court. Counsel should be prepared to concisely present the strongest or most 
significant elements of the case. . . . The Court encourages counsel to submit the 
matter with time remaining if appropriate.”71 The Utah rules openly accept the 
value of oral argument, but simultaneously undercut that value by limiting its use 
in the execution of the rule. 
                                                     
58 UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). 
59 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 46; UTAH R. APP. P. 12(b). 
60 See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 46. 
61 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ORAL ARGUMENT 
BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 1 (2011). 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 Id. at 1. 
64 Id. at 3. 
65 Id. at 2. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 4. 
68 See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 3; THE ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 3. 
69 See THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
70 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4; THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 4. 
71 THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 61, at 4. 
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V.  PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM 
 
The failures described above strengthen the argument that the solution is 
modification, not abolishment.72 This section proposes several procedural 
strategies that can remedy the problems described in Part III. These proposals can 
either be taken as a whole or taken piecemeal; regardless, they will have a positive 
effect on the overall quality of oral argument in Utah and the national appellate 
system. 
 
A.  Tentative Opinions Issued Before Oral Argument 
 
An effective way to curb tangential lines of questioning from aggressive 
judges, to better prepare the litigants, and to narrow the focus of discussion in oral 
argument is for the court to circulate a tentative opinion among all the parties 
before argument takes place. A draft decision or tentative-opinion program is not 
new to state appellate practice or even to the justice system in general. Although it 
has not yet been used in the Utah appellate system or on the federal appellate level, 
it has been implemented in both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the California 
Court of Appeals with great success.73 Furthermore, prior to its implementation in 
these state appellate courts, many state trial courts and administrative courts had 
employed this process to improve the quality of counsel’s arguments.74 In essence, 
a tentative-opinion program is a type of reverse briefing whereby the court reveals 
where it stands prior to oral argument. 
 
1.  The Arizona Model 
 
In 1982, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was the first appellate 
system in the country to implement the tentative-draft distribution procedure.75 
Under the Arizona model, once oral argument is scheduled for an appeal, the 
process takes the following four-step procedure. First, after the panel of judges has 
read the parties’ briefs, an assigned judge prepares a draft opinion asserting his 
own decision of the case.76 The author of this tentative opinion is not revealed to 
                                                     
72 See discussion supra Part III. 
73 See Hummels, supra note 29, at 329–38. 
74 Id. at 320 (citing People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 419 (Cal. 1990)); Philip M. Saeta, 
Tentative Opinions: Letting a Little Sunshine into Appellate Decision Making, JUDGES J., 
Fall 1981, at 20, 21; see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 53 (1976) 
(“Trial courts were early modern pioneers of disseminating draft decisions. The Los 
Angeles Superior Court began issuing tentative rulings before oral argument in its law and 
motion and discovery courts in the mid-1960s. Administrative tribunals also have long 
benefited from the use of recommended or tentative decisions.”). 
75 Hummels, supra note 29, at 320. 
76 Id. at 330. 
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the parties.77 Second, the assigned judge then circulates the draft opinion among 
the other judges on the panel with an opportunity to informally discuss the case 
and come to a tentative meeting of the minds.78 This informal discussion, however, 
does not constitute an official vote and thus the draft decision is still the initial 
view of the author.79 Third, the court notifies the parties of the scheduled date and 
time for oral argument and that a draft opinion is available.80 Fourth, after 
receiving this notice, litigants have ten days to alert the court that they do not want 
the tentative opinion distributed.81 Finally, if all parties agree to the dissemination 
of the opinion, the draft is distributed to the parties for use in preparation for oral 
argument seven to ten days prior to the scheduled date of oral argument.82 
The beauty of the Arizona draft opinion procedure is that it is informal and 
“not followed rigidly in all cases.”83 This allows the judges some flexibility and to 
adapt to the changing needs of each case.84 For example, sometimes a judge 
assigned to draft an opinion is unable to finish before the assigned oral argument 
date. In such a case, the court can continue without draft distribution or it can 
reschedule the oral argument to allow for the completion of the draft.85 This loose 
approach to the procedure gives the court the ability, in the event of a full docket, 
to dispense with the draft distribution and to continue on with the scheduled cases. 
When procedure becomes more important than the goal it aims to achieve, the 
court system finds itself engaging in counterproductive behavior. The Arizona 
approach solves that problem. 
Moreover, the Arizona draft opinion procedure allows the attorneys involved 
in the appeal to know what issues are important to the panel. It also helps them 
tailor their presentation to resolve any concerns the judges might have. 
Additionally, the draft opinion permits the attorneys to clarify any erroneous 
assumptions the panel might have in regard to their case.86 As noted above, the 
Arizona draft opinion distribution procedure has been successful and welcomed by 
judges and attorneys. In 1987, the court initiated an informal study to measure the 
overall reception and effectiveness of the process.87 The study found that the draft 
opinion procedure 
 
1) made oral argument more useful for both counsel and the court by 
ensuring that judges were better prepared for argument and by focusing 
the attention of judges and advocates on the significant issues in the case; 







83 Id. at 331. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 350. 
87 Id. at 332. 
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2) gave counsel an opportunity to clarify perceived errors of fact or law 
in the draft, at a time when the court was viewed to be more responsive 
to such suggestions than it would be during a motion for reconsideration 
after a decision; and 3) served to keep the judges and their staff “on 
track” with their caseload by establishing an “artificial deadline” for draft 
rulings before argument, and by enabling panels of judges to move 
quickly to a final opinion or memorandum immediately following oral 
argument.88 
 
Accordingly, the benefits and flexibility that the Arizona model provides can help 
Utah reshape its approach to oral argument and help make it relevant again. 
 
2.  The California Model 
 
The California model also provides a unique approach to oral argument 
procedure, and if coupled with some of the pieces of the Arizona model, it could 
offer a more polished approach that will improve oral arguments. In 1990, about a 
decade after Arizona initiated its draft opinion procedure, the California Court of 
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, followed suit.89 The idea arose 
out of a need to improve oral argument and make it more useful to the parties 
involved.90 The challenge in California was that, like Utah, parties are granted oral 
argument by right, and thus the court hears oral argument in almost all cases.91 The 
court needed to take a different approach to handle the amount of arguments it was 
hearing. The court enacted a model similar in some respects to Arizona’s model, 
but the California model interjects new procedures to remedy specific problems 
within its jurisdiction. 
One major divergence from the Arizona plan is that California requires a vote 
by all judges on the panel of its draft opinions, whereas Arizona only requires an 
informal conference.92 As a result of the vote, the draft becomes a “tentative 
opinion” rather than a “draft opinion.”93 Another difference in the California 
approach is the notice given to parties in regard to the tentative opinion. After the 
judges have voted on the tentative opinion, it is mailed to the parties with an  
“oral argument waiver notice” usually one to two months prior to the scheduled  
oral argument.94 
Like the Arizona model, the California model has been well received and has 
been effective in accomplishing its purposes. According to Justice Thomas E. 
Hollenhorst, one of the justices responsible for fashioning the California model, 
the tentative-opinion program made oral argument more useful to the court and to 
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89 Id. at 333. 
90 Id. at 333–34. 
91 Id. at 334 n.135. 
92 Id. at 334. 
93 Id. at 334–35. 
94 Id. at 334. 
NO. 1] ORAL ARGUMENT REFORM IN UTAH’S APPELLATE COURTS 187 
counsel.95 In regard to counsel’s response to the program, Justice Hollenhorst said, 
“In both civil and criminal matters, counsel almost always reported great benefit in 
planning their strategy for oral argument and deciding which issues to concede and 
which to pursue.”96 The most dramatic effect the California model has had on oral 
argument is the way counsel’s presentations now play before the judges. 
Traditionally, counsel sparred with one another, attacking each other’s arguments 
from the briefs. Conversely, under the tentative-opinion program, an early winner 
and loser have already been determined, and thus “[c]ounsel no longer argue 
against each other but become proponents or opponents of the tentative decision 
draft.”97 This paradigm shift has resulted in more lively debates during oral 
argument, and “[w]here counsel raise[s] legitimate concerns about the contents of 
the tentative opinion, the court, rather than becoming embroiled in a defense of it, 
defers to the opposing counsel to respond to the concerns.”98 Accordingly, the 
issues are crystalized for all the parties and a productive forum is created, rather 
than a formalistic setting where little is accomplished. 
Lastly, in 2004, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion discussing 
whether the tentative-opinion program in Division Two violated the parties’ right 
“to oral argument on appeal in California.”99 The court held that the practice was 
permissible but warned against the use of the waiver sheet, concerned that it could 
discourage litigants from pursuing oral argument.100 Overall, the court was pleased 
with the program, stating, “We applaud innovations, such as the tentative opinion 
program adopted by the Court of Appeal here, that are initiated to maintain the 
quality and integrity of the judicial process in spite of [courts’ increasing caseloads 
and financial constraints].”101 The tentative-opinion program is still only used in 
division two and has yet to spread to other divisions within the fourth district. 
 
3.  Tentative Opinion Proposal for Utah 
 
The Utah appellate court system and its oral argument procedure would 
benefit greatly from implementing a tentative-opinion program. The proposed 
program should reflect the basic structure of the Arizona model with some of the 
alterations of the California model. Additionally, new provisions should be 
included to expand on the successes that California and Arizona have experienced. 
The proposed Utah model should operate under a three-step process. First, 
after briefs have been submitted and oral argument has been requested in either the 
Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, a judge on the assigned panel 
hearing the argument will be randomly selected to write a draft decision. Second, 
                                                     
95 Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their Benefit in the 
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97 Id. at 20. 
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as in the California model, after the completion of the draft, the other judges on the 
panel will review the draft, contribute feedback, and vote as to whether it reflects 
the mind of the court. If all the judges agree, the draft decision will then become a 
tentative opinion. Although it may take longer to draft and to vote on, the tentative 
opinion provides counsel a better prospective of where the entire panel of judges 
stand in regard to the case.102 Under Arizona’s draft-decision model, counsel may 
be misled to believe that the entire panel is in conformity with the draft and may 
address arguments only pertinent to one judge, thus causing oral argument to be 
lopsided and ineffective. Moreover, when counsel is aware of the entire panel’s 
position, it may reconsider a certain approach or abandon seeking oral argument 
altogether.103 Thus, dedicating time early in the process to produce a tentative 
opinion better prepares the judges and counsel for oral argument, and as a result it 
lays a foundation for oral argument to be more efficient and effective. Finally, 
using a tentative-opinion approach over a draft opinion may save time in that it 
may help reduce the number of frivolous and unwarranted oral arguments that 
continue forward. In a sense, it is better to spend a dime now to save a dollar later. 
Third, after the completion of the panel’s vote, the litigants are notified by e-mail 
of the date and time scheduled for oral argument and that a tentative opinion is 
available for distribution pending acceptance by both parties. Both the appellant 
and appellee will then have ten days to opt out of the program. If neither party 
sends correspondence within the ten days, the panel will disseminate the tentative 
opinion—ideally between fourteen and twenty-one days prior to oral argument. 
The above proposal assumes that each member of the panel of judges will 
agree on the preliminary draft decision and that the three-step process can be 
accomplished in a reasonable time—avoiding a backlog in the court’s calendar. In 
the event that problems occur, the proposed Utah model will default to the flexible 
approach adopted by Arizona.104 The court can either postpone oral argument or 
dispense entirely with the tentative opinion.105 What the Utah model will do 
differently, however, is that it will still require some kind of communication from 
the panel to the litigants prior to oral argument. This communication could be the 
draft opinion with disclaimers that it only contains one judge’s opinion. It could 
also be a type of interrogatory, addressing questions that the judges may ask in oral 
argument.106 The purpose of this portion of the proposal is to eliminate the element 
of surprise during oral argument and to give counsel some direction while 
preparing. Time and disagreement among judges are not the only potential 
drawbacks to the proposed Utah model; however, additional drawbacks will likely 
be overcome by including flexible and simple procedural additions. 
Another popular criticism of the tentative-opinion program among reluctant 
courts is the “judges' concern with opening their internal ‘work product’ to public 
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inspection.”107 This hesitation can be overcome by scheduling an opportunity for 
counsel to read the tentative opinion in camera. Under this approach, courts would 
require attorneys to review draft opinions in the judge’s chambers under a 
specified time limit. If these courts are still uncomfortable with such transparency, 
at the very least, the court can still engage in a process of distributing 
questionnaires prior to oral argument in an effort to refine issues at the hearing. 
A related criticism is the potential reluctance to change the draft opinion once 
it has been formulated, much like cognitive bias or “front loading.” Judge 
Hollenhorst addressed this issue by explaining “that the same arguments about the 
court becoming locked into a position in a tentative decision can also be made after 
the use of traditional oral argument and release of an opinion which for some 
reason has been shown to be erroneous.”108 Furthermore, as explained above, the 
judges are also prone to this weakness after their initial reading of the briefs or 
during their preparation for oral argument. Thus, concluding that tentative opinions 
are tainted because of a judge’s unwillingness to change his mind is unfounded 
because judges are prone to do this with or without an established tentative-opinion 
program in place. A solution to this judicial shortcoming will be addressed in the 
next section. 
Consequently, a tentative-decision program gives direction to oral argument 
by inviting the attorneys to point out flaws in the tentative opinions. These 
opinions are described as “targets,” at which the parties are encouraged to take 
careful aim.109 The tentative-opinion process keeps judges conscientious of their 
work and provides transparency to the public. The procedural development of a 
tentative-opinion program in Utah will refine the judge’s line of questioning and 
better prepare counsel for the process of presenting the client’s case to the court. 
As a result, oral argument will improve, and more equitable decisions will  
be reached. 
 
B.  Restructuring the Procedural Format of Oral Argument 
 
In addition to providing an indication of what the court will likely discuss at 
oral argument, a wholesale procedural format change will further help revitalize 
the judicial process. Implementing a conference model, rather than the rigid model 
currently in place, will make the conversation between the judges and counsel less 
formal and more productive. Judges actually prefer the conference model, and it 
brings a greater sense of organization to the conversation between the advocate and 
the panel. Former Deputy Solicitor General Stephen M. Shapiro believes “most 
appellate courts [and] the Justices of the Supreme Court view . . . [oral] argument, 
not as an occasion for speeches or a game of 20 questions, but rather as an initial 
conference convened to decide the case.”110 He also asserts that “Counsel is invited 
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into the conference for two purposes: to serve as a resource, providing information 
needed to clarify the thinking of the Justices; and to bring an organizing theme, 
emphasis, and a note of drama needed to marshal the information in a meaningful 
way.”111 
Instead of following an arcane format of judges sitting in elevated benches, 
the Utah appellate courts should implement a format similar to that used at 
congressional committee hearings.112 Under this format, all the parties, including 
the panel of judges, will sit at level tables facing one another. While seated, 
attorneys will each receive two to five uninterrupted minutes to summarize their 
position. Thereafter, each judge will have at least ten minutes to question each 
attorney.113 If additional time is required for either counsel or the panel, an 
extension should be granted liberally.114 During this questioning process, counsel 
can address one another, and a conversation will take place among all the parties—
rather than a rushed and interrupted show of oratory skill. At the end of the 
question-and-answer period, the parties will be dismissed and the oral argument 
will be officially over.115 
Another common law rule that can be implemented allows for a more open 
discussion at oral argument by giving the parties the option to address new 
arguments not addressed in their briefs. According to Yee v. City of Escondido,116 
“Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in 
support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made 
below.”117 Implementing this rule will make oral argument less dependent on the 
written briefs and more open to a fluid conversation of the legal issues. Justice 
Mosk, discussing this notion, stated, “[N]ot infrequently oral argument develops a 
new issue overlooked or not adequately briefed. This gives the court an 
opportunity to instruct counsel to prepare supplemental briefing during a specified 
period.”118 As a result, no stone will be left unturned, and oral argument will be 
better equipped to help the court render a just decision. This format will 
completely change the atmosphere at oral argument. Judges will no longer be able 
to interrupt counsel with frivolous questions, and attorneys will be required to 
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come prepared to discuss the pertinent merits of the appeal. An actual conversation 
will occur between the panel and the attorneys, and the court will engage in a 
thorough analysis of the law. 
 
C.  Judicial “Debiasing Strategies”119 
 
One procedural modification that will free the judges from confirmation bias 
and contribute to a more useful oral argument discussion is the application of a 
cognitive filter test to the appellate review process. This solution solves a key 
criticism of the tentative-decision program. As described above, confirmation bias 
is the cognitive process of only favoring information that supports a particular 
theory or belief, rather than accepting information that may disconfirm that 
previously held belief.120 This cognitive limitation may affect a judge’s ability to 
objectively use information received at oral argument in deciding the appeal. 
Professor Alafair Burke proposed a test that assists criminal prosecutors in 
removing their confirmation bias, and as a result decreases the number of wrongful 
convictions.121 This same test can be applied to judges as they embark in the 
appellate review process, especially as they approach oral argument. 
 
1.  Professor Burke’s Prosecutorial Debiasing Strategies 
 
The core component of Professor Burke’s proposal is to enact noninvasive 
reform that neither requires cumbersome implementation nor carries with it bags of 
controversy.122 Her proposal is nimble and puts the responsibility of 
implementation on the prosecutors.123 This intuitive approach may be the best way 
to initiate reform; however, it requires the judges, individually or collectively as a 
panel, to implement the following four debiasing strategies.124 
The first strategy Professor Burke proposes is a simple plan of education.125 
Evidence shows that learning about the dangers of confirmation bias contributes to 
mitigating its harmful effects.126 This can be accomplished relatively easily by 
requiring periodic training.127 Evidence also suggests, however, that education 
alone cannot overcome confirmation bias, and therefore it must be united with 
other strategies.128 
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Second, Professor Burke proposes an individual devil’s advocate system 
where prosecutors are “forced to articulate arguments that contradict their existing 
beliefs.”129 Research reveals that “induced counterargument” combined with 
exposure to opposing viewpoints help to remove confirmation bias.130 
The third debiasing strategy revolves around internal reviews. Since relying 
solely on oneself to see a different perspective might fail due to a lack of effort or 
an overwhelmingly strong confirmation bias, Professor Burke suggests using 
others who are less invested in a particular outcome to help in the decision making 
process.131 This process is basically a form of the devil’s advocate strategy, but 
instead of being one’s own devil’s advocate, another noninvested individual 
provides a “fresh look.”132 This conversation can take place formally or informally 
depending on the importance of the case.133 In either alternative, this form of 
confirmation debiasing confronts individuals holding the bias and forces them to 
reconsider their stance. Through this internal review, another layer of redundancy 
is inserted to assist the prosecutor in his effort to remove the bias. 
The last proposed strategy revolves around a system of “external 
transparency.”134 This strategy interjects the last line of defense against 
confirmation bias. Where education is susceptible to lack of attention, and devil’s 
advocate exercises with an uninvolved individual are prone to groupthink, this 
strategy of opening up to others’ scrutiny will force individuals with confirmation 
bias to rethink their position. Professor Burke suggests that external transparency 
can consist of advisory “fresh look” committees, which are operated by civilians 
“permitting outsiders such as judges, civil practitioners, and defense attorneys to 
review their discretionary conduct.”135 Although this may be the most 
controversial layer in the defense against confirmation bias, the proposal is up to 
the prosecutors to decide and implement, which allows them to choose an external 
check that is reasonable to their circumstances. 
 
2.  Judicial Debiasing Strategies for the Utah Appellate System 
 
Although Professor Burke created her proposal with criminal prosecutors in 
mind, the principles are applicable to judges engaged in appellate review. Before 
the substantive applicability is discussed, it is important to note that Professor 
Burke’s notion of nimble reform is procedurally applicable as well. These 
strategies can quickly be initiated if the judges themselves take the responsibility to 
implement them, thereby avoiding cumbersome and controversial steps that would 
involve the state legislature. Concerning Professor Burke’s first education strategy, 
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judges could schedule a monthly or quarterly training seminar where the effects of 
confirmation bias are discussed. This should be easy to implement because most 
state bar requirements already call for some kind of continuing education course. 
This confirmation bias training could be incorporated into that schedule. 
The devil’s advocate strategy is already informally in place in most appellate 
courts. The process of oral argument itself is a forum for judges to confront 
opposing viewpoints. This process is not sufficient, however,136 and additional 
lines of defense should be built. One possible strategy, related to Professor Burke’s 
second recommendation, is to require the judge to argue more heavily and ask 
questions against his previously held viewpoint during oral argument. Regarding 
the tentative-opinion program, the court could require an alternate judge to write a 
tentative dissenting memorandum opinion in an effort to present the panel with a 
different outlook on the case. The court could invite judges that are not assigned to 
the case to provide feedback that would take place in either formal or informal 
meetings. Additionally, the revised format for oral argument proposed above 
would lend itself to a more open discussion among the judges and the attorneys, 
and in turn, it would be a more effective type of devil’s advocacy than the  
original format. 
Finally, the court could implement external transparencies in an effort to 
eliminate confirmation bias. The tentative-opinion program offers a viable strategy 
in this category. By allowing counsel to see the court’s tentative opinions, the 
judges are forced to explain their positions using facts, and when combined with 
the other strategies above, they will be more aware of their propensity to allow 
confirmation bias to influence their decision. At the other extreme, the court could 
organize a panel of local practitioners to review a judge’s suspected confirmation 
biases by comparing tentative opinions with discussions at oral argument and the 
ultimate decision in the case. These committees would be completely advisory, 
much like the committees used in Professor Burke’s example, and would be used 
in situations where the court itself institutes the committee by invitation. Applying 
any of the above strategies will breed a culture that is aware of the dangers  
of confirmation bias and is able to remove that bias from judicial  
decisions. Consequently, oral argument will become more useful and relevant for  
everyone involved. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, the current institution of oral argument in the national and Utah 
appellate court systems must be revitalized to save a legal practice that has 
positively contributed to the development of the law. The purposes served by oral 
argument—client advocacy and equitable appellate review—cannot be lost merely 
because the procedure is outdated. By implementing a tentative-opinion program, 
oral argument will be more focused and meaningful. By reformatting the 
procedural logistics of oral argument, the parties will be uninhibited in their 
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approach to the conversation. Finally, by employing judicial debiasing strategies, 
the judges will be aware of their confirmation bias propensities and, as a result, 
will arrive at better decisions. The Utah appellate process will be reinvigorated and 
will avoid the “sorry day” when oral argument becomes meaningless. 
